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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
Nos. 05-3803 & 05-4795
__________
RUDY SUSANTO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
__________
On Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
U.S. Department of Justice
(BIA No. A95-368-427)
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 26, 2007
Before: McKEE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges and RESTANI,* Judge
(Opinion Filed: August 6, 2007)
2__________
OPINION
__________
McKee, Circuit Judge:
In these consolidated appeals, Rudy Paulus Susanto petitions for review of two
orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals.  In the first, the BIA denied Susanto’s
request for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In the second, the Board denied Susanto’s motion
to reopen proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny both petitions.
I.
Since we write primarily for the parties, we will forgo lengthy recitation of the
facts and procedural history well-known to the parties.  We have jurisdiction to review a
final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), (d)(1).  Where the BIA issued
decisions on the merits, we review the BIA’s decisions rather than the IJ’s.Gao v.
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d. Cir. 2002).  We review the BIA’s decision denying
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT for substantial evidence on the
record.  Our review of Susanto’s argument that the BIA erred in applying our decision in
Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005), retroactively is reviewed de novo.  We 
review the BIA’s denial of Susanto’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.
3A.
To establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, Susanto must
establish that he is a “refugee.”  8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1).   He must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is unwilling to return to Indonesia “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). 
Persecution can either be individualized or part of a “pattern or practice.”  8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A).  To be well-founded, an alien’s fear of persecution must be
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469
(3d Cir. 2003).  Past persecution raises a rebuttable presumption that fear of persecution is
well-founded   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).  As we noted in Fatin v. INS, “the BIA [has]
interpreted ‘persecution’ to include threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  12 F.3d 1233, 1240
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985)). 
Moreover, the harm must be  “committed by the government or forces the government is
either unable or unwilling to control.”  Abdurahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d
Cir. 2003).
“Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s  finding  must be upheld
unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v.
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001); see also INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S.
4478, 480 (1992).  Our review is limited to the “record on which the order of removal is
based.”  8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)(A).  The BIA did not disturb the IJ’s finding that Susanto
was credible.  Matter of Susanto, No. A95-368-427 (BIA 2005), at 1; App. 006
[hereinafter Susanto Appeal].  Accordingly, the BIA accepted that Susanto’s subjective
fear of persecution is genuine.  The BIA concluded, however, that Susanto’s fear was not
objectively reasonable and therefore not well-founded.  Id. at App. 007; see Zubeda, 333
F.3d at 469.
The BIA reviewed Susanto’s evidence of specific instances of conflicts with ethnic
Indonesians and determined that he had not shown these were consistently motivated by
ethnicity or religion but noted that, even if they were, the harm Susanto suffered as a
result does not rise to the level of persecution.  Susanto Appeal, 1-2; App. 006-007. 
Susanto’s mother had to  claim that he was “illegitimate” so that he would have an
ethnically Indonesian name and be eligible for an Indonesian passport.  Transcript of
Removal Hearing, at 54-55, Matter of Susanto, No. A95-368-427; App. 095-096
[hereinafter, “Transcript”].  As a school child, ethnic Indonesians called Susanto names,
fought with him, and on one occasion, a group of eight schoolmates stole his watch and
money.  Transcript, at 29-30; App. 070-071.  Susanto was beaten and suffered a fracture
in the course of defending a Chinese girl from being molested by ethnic Indonesians. 
Transcript, at 31-36; App. 072-077.  Ethnic Indonesians slashed Susanto’s arm with a
knife and took his motorbike; when the incident was reported, the police demanded an
5administrative fee.  Transcript, at 37-40; App. 078-081.  During high school, Susanto and
a friend fought with a pair of ethnic Indonesians; the next day, a large group of ethnic
Indonesians came to the Catholic high school Susanto attended, threw stones, damaged
school vehicles and property, and injured a number of Susanto’s classmates.  Transcript,
at 42-44; App. 083-085.  One Christmas eve, Muslims yelled and threw stones at
Susanto’s church, Transcript, at 44-46, 49; App. 085-087, 090.  On several occasions,
Susanto had to pay higher administrative fees for government services than ethnic
Indonesian would have paid, and was subject to administrative fees of questionable
validity when reporting crimes in hopes of police investigation.  E.g., Transcript, at 51,
56, 62-63; App. 092, 097, 103-104.  During one such encounter, a police officer slapped
Susanto.  Transcript, at 70; App. 070.
“Persecution” under the immigration laws does not “encompass all treatment that
our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional,” Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1240, 1240 n.10.  Based upon our review of this record, we agree that the
evidence does not compel a conclusion of past persecution.  Most of the incidents do not
entail “threats to life or freedom.”  Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.  In the incidents arguably
approaching this threshold – the slashing and the large group attack on Susanto’s school –
the actors were private.  In the slashing incident, the Susanto testified that he could
identify the attackers as “natives,” but offered no indications of racial or religious
motivation for the crime.  Transcript, at 37-39; App. 079-080.  In the case of the school
6attacks, Susanto testified that police arrived within ten minutes, and their presence alone
was sufficient to disperse the attackers.  Transcript, at 43; App. 084.  This is inconsistent
with the governmental involvement or acquiescence that is required to establish
persecution.  Moreover, although the fees Susanto had to pay to the police were certainly
appear unfair and unjust, he does not suggest that they caused severe economic hardship 
to him or his relatives, who were able to work and attend school in Indonesia.  Transcript,
at 72-73; App. 113-14.  Rather, they appear not that different from bribes or “puts” that
are common in developing countries.  We note also that Susanto was able to become a
star athlete in Indonesia and to travel to the United States for an athletic competition. 
App. 053, 428.  For these reasons, we conclude that the BIA’s determination that Susanto
had not been persecuted is supported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, the burden of
showing fear of future persecution remained with Susanto.
There is also substantial evidence to support the BIA’s determination that a
reasonable person in Susanto’s circumstances would not harbor a well-founded fear of
future persecution, either of individually or as part of a pattern and practice persecuting a
racial, religious, nationality, or social group of which he is a member.  See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(iii).  Susanto’s family has continued to live, attend school, practice their
religion, and work in Indonesia.  Transcript, at 72-73; App. 113-14.  No evidence
suggests Susanto’s family in Indonesia is being persecuted and Susanto has stated no
reason why he would be treated more severely than his relatives who remained there. 
7Moreover, to the extent Susanto’s evidence establishes a “pattern and practice” of
mistreatment of Christians, Catholics, ethnic Chinese, and/or Chinese Christians, he has
not been able to show that the persecution involved the government or that the
government of Indonesia is unwilling or unable to control the activity.  See Abdurahman,
330 F.3d at 592.  In fact as noted earlier the police responded when called while he was
being attacked at school and their presence appears to have been prompt and effective. 
Transcript at 43-44; App. 084-085  Moreover, the State Department reports in evidence
when the BIA rendered its decision indicate that Catholicism is among the faiths
officially recognized by the government, that ethnic Chinese “play[] a major role in the
economy[,]” and that [i]nstances of discrimination and harassment of ethnic Chinese
Indonesians declined compared with previous years.”  U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Indonesia 14, 24; App. 296, 306 [hereinafter 2004 Country Report].  This clearly does not
compel a conclusion that the BIA erred in finding that Susanto’s fear of persecution was
not well-founded.  
Although asylum is within the discretion of the Attorney General, withholding of
removal is mandatory if the alien proves that it is more likely than not that he will be
persecuted.  28 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30  (1984);
Ghebrehiwot, 467 F.3d at 351.   Since this is a higher burden than the well-founded fear
8required for asylum, Susanto’s failure to establish eligibility for asylum dooms his claim
for withholding of removal. Id.  
B.
As we pointed out in Ghebrehiwot, failure to show eligibility for asylum or
entitlement to withholding of removal does not necessarily preclude protection under the
CAT.  Id. at 358; Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 476.  In order to receive protection under the CAT,
a removable alien must show that it is more likely than not that he/she will be tortured if
removed.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-175 (3d Cir. 2002).  However, the alien
need not establish any nexus between the torture and membership in a protected group or
a protected status.  He/she need only establish the probability of torture. Ghebrehiwot,
467 F.3d at 352 (citations omitted).  The regulations implementing the CAT provide in
relevant part: 
(1) Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.
(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and
does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment that do not amount to torture.
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(1)-(2).
9The BIA’s discussion of the CAT was exceedingly brief, but it was sufficient.
Based on this record, the CAT claim appears little more than a “throw-in.”  Susanto’s real
claim is that he is a “refugee” entitled to withholding of removal or asylum.  He does not
really claim that his treatment would amount to torture if he returned, and the record
would not support any such argument.  Thus, the BIA correctly rejected it. See Susanto
Appeal, at 2; App. 007 (“Specifically, we do not find sufficient evidence that it is more
likely than not that [Susanto] would be tortured if returned to Indonesia.”).
C. 
Susanto also argues that the BIA’s reliance on our decision in Lie v. Ashcroft, 396
F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005), that  was filed after the IJ’s grant of asylum, was an ex post facto
application of law thereby denying him the due process of law the Constitution
guarantees. The argument is meritless.  Adjudicators must apply court decisions in effect
when a given case is decided. See Harrison v. Ryan, F.2d 84, 86 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Furthermore, Lie did nothing to change the definition of “persecution,” “torture,” or an
alien’s burden of proof.  In addition, the BIA did not rely on Lie in finding Susanto’s fear
of persecution was not well-founded.  Susanto Appeal, A95-368-427, at 2; App. 007.  
Rather, the Board simply concluded, based upon Susanto’s testimony and the State
Department’s assessments of Indonesia,  that Susanto’s fear of persecution, while
credible, was not well-founded.  We agree.  Accordingly, neither the BIA’s use of the
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phrase “in light of . . . Lie” nor its citation to Lie represent a violation of Susanto’s due
process rights.   Thus, the BIA correctly sustained the appeal of the IJ’s grant of relief. 
II.
We review the BIA’s October 26, 2005 denial of Susanto’s motion to reopen
proceedings for abuse of discretion.  Denial of Motion to Reopen, Matter of Susanto,
A95--368-427 (BIA 2005) [hereinafter Denial of Motion to Reopen]. Our review is highly
deferential and we will reverse the Board’s decision only if “arbitrary, irrational, or
contrary to law.”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174; see Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir.
2001).  As the BIA correctly noted, motions to reopen must state the new facts that will
be proved and must make a prima facie showing that the alien is eligible for the relief
sought.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
Susanto offered to prove that, as a result of being falsely accused of a sex offense
and despite his eventual acquittal of the charges, his fear of persecution is now well-
founded.  App. 190-92.  When the BIA reversed the grant of asylum and ordered Susanto
removed, all information regarding his beating, arrest, initial conviction, June 2005
acquittal, and the media coverage of these events was available; it could have been
argued, but was not.  App. 147-50.  Nevertheless, the BIA considered all evidence
presented in denying Susanto’s motion to reopen.  It was within the discretion of the BIA
to find the State Department Country Reports more persuasive than Susanto’s fears of
persecution and torture, the general information regarding the incidence of
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disappearances and extrajudicial killings, and the affidavit of Susanto’s expert stating
Susanto faced a newly-heightened likelihood of persecution.  See Ambartsoumian v.
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2004); Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir.
2004).
  Moreover, Susanto has not offered any evidence of the existence of any social
group comprised of persons accused of sex offenses in Indonesia.  Accordingly, it was
well within the BIA’s discretion to consider the absence of any such evidence in the
Country Reports in denying his petition to reopen.  Although the BIA’s discussion was
exceedingly minimal, it was adequate.  We can not fault the BIA for failing to discuss
more thoroughly nonexistent evidence of a social group that may or may not exist.  
Finally, unlike the decision we reviewed in Ghebrehiwot, the Board did not say
that the alien’s application for relief under CAT necessarily failed because he was
ineligible for asylum, stating instead that Susanto had failed to establish a prima facie
claim for relief.  Compare Ghebrehiwot, 467 F.3d at 358, with Denial of Motion to
Reopen, at 2; App. 003.
V.
For the reasons above, we will deny Susanto’s petition for review of the BIA’s
decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT and we
will deny Susanto’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of his petition to reopen
removal proceedings.
